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Abstract 
Microfinance has been recognized as an effective tool in helping poor people and 
developing rural economy since its beginning in the late 1970s. Empirical research 
provides convincing evidence for its significant contribution to social development in 
various economies. However, we see huge variation at their performance level among 
different economies. Considering their immense impact on economic development 
and poverty reduction, it is important to understand sustainability of the microfinance 
institutions (MFIs).  
It is believed that the entry of MFIs would adversely impact informal sector lenders. It 
is puzzling that even with enormous growth of MFIs over the last few decades; we 
still see coexistence of these two forms of lending. I analyze how informational 
asymmetry may explain this coexistence. I develop a simple theoretical model to 
explore the role of informational constraint on the optimal contract offered by MFIs. 
Among other findings, we see that MFIs objective to screen good projects from the 
bad projects may put additional constraint in removing informal sector lending or in 
increasing borrowers‘ payoff. In addition, in my thesis, I provide a review of 
empirical evidences on microfinance‘s poverty reduction effect. Finally, I briefly 
discuss the issues related to sustainability of microfinance.  
Key words: microfinance institutions, poverty reduction, informal money lending, 
sustainable development, subsidy 
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1 Introduction 
Microfinance is the provision of microcredit and other financial services to the poor 
and low-income people. It emerges as one of the most innovative intervention in the 
financial sector and brings huge influence in economic development. Over the last 
few decades, it has developed vigorously, becoming a powerful component of 
economic development, poverty alleviation and economic regeneration strategies 
around the world.  
Microfinance‘s growth and development has been extremely rapid since its 
appearance in the late 1970s. During the 1970s and 1980s, the microenterprise 
movement led to the emergence of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that 
provided small loans for the poor. By the end of 1997, microfinance institutions 
(MFIs) had 13.5 million clients. As of December 31, 2007, 3552 microcredit 
institutions reported reaching 155 million clients, 106 million of whom were among 
the poorest when they took their first loan
1
. The United Nations declared 2005 the 
International Year of Microfinance. Besides, microfinance attracted worldwide 
attention and was further promoted after the Nobel Peace Prize for Dr. Muhammad 
Yunus in 2006 (Pischke, 2009).  
The following table shows results of the verification process as reported by the 
Microcredit Summit Campaign 2006  
 
 
 
                                        
1 Daley-Harris 2009 Microcredit Summit Campaign 
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Table 1.1 
Year 
Number of 
Institutions 
Verified 
Number of 
Poorest Clients 
Verified 
Percent Verified of 
Total Poorest Clients 
Reported (%) 
Total Number of 
Poorest Clients 
Reported 
2000 78 9,274,385 67 13,779,872 
2001 138 12,752,645 66 19,327,451 
2002 211 21,771,448 81 26,878,332 
2003 234 35,837,356 86 41,594,778 
2004 286 47,458,191 87 54,785,433 
2005 330 58,450,926 88 66,614,871 
2006 420 64,062,221 78 81,949,036 
 Source: Daley-Harris (2006)
2
 , Table 1. 
What factors account for the emergence and growth of microfinance? It was designed 
to combat the market failure problem experienced in most of the underdeveloped and 
developing parts of the economy. For several reasons, the poor has little access to 
credit. Due to lack of information about poor borrowers‘ ability to repay and their 
inability to provide collateral, banks and other profit-oriented financial institutions 
typically cannot provide credit to the poor. Thus, it has a direct adverse effect on 
poverty reduction. Besides, lack of credit hampers growth of business and creation of 
jobs, thus contributing to underdevelopment of the poverty-struck areas. In absence of 
formal credit sector, many poor people in rural areas borrow money from informal 
moneylenders. On many occasions, informal money lending turned out to be more 
                                        
2 http://www.microcreditsummit.org/pubs/reports/socr/2006/SOCR06.pdf 
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exploitative and devastating to the poor‘s economic situation. Thus, a primary 
objective of MFIs was to provide financial services for poor people and reduce 
exploitation by informal lender. It promises to bring a series of exciting possibilities 
for extending markets and developing small scale economy in a sustainable way. 
Microfinance has also been recognized as an effective tool in alleviating poverty 
(Daley-Harris 2002). The poorest and poverty reduction have become the object of 
unprecedented attention at international summits in the 1990‘s. Canada, through the 
Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), has committed to the targets 
set by both the OECD International Development Goals and, most recently, the 
Millennium Goals which focus on poverty reduction for those living on less than a 
dollar a day. It is clear from the evidence that there are strong potential synergies 
between microfinance and the provision of basic social services for clients (Morduch 
& Haley, 2001). The benefits derived from microfinance, basic education, and 
primary health are interconnected, and programs have found that the impact of each 
can increase when they are delivered together. This recognition has caused the 
government to carry out microfinance as an important agenda in development.  
Morduch (2000) has also emphasized the need to develop the institutional capacity in 
a cost effective way, in order to achieve sustainability. However, it has been debated 
that emphasizing financial sustainability can have an adverse effect of excluding the 
poorer section of the economy because of the perception that the poor are at a greater 
credit risk and that the unit cost of small loans tend to exceed the unit cost of large 
loans. Thus, as microfinance movement progresses over the years, it has been 
continuously evaluated and modified accordingly to achieve the three important goals 
– a) extending market and freeing borrowers from the clutches of informal 
moneylenders, b) reduce poverty through social development and c) building the 
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credit sector in a sustainable way. Several microfinance programs have been designed 
to achieve these goals. But the performances of these programs are mixed. They have 
both positive and negative impacts. 
Although microfinance gets considerable success in bringing basic financial services 
to rural areas and to the poor sections, it does not necessarily reduce the volume of 
informal money lending. Informal lenders seem to be thriving even in regions where 
MFIs have built microcredit programs. Jain & Mansuri (2003) gave considerable 
evidence that MFI clients not only borrow money extensively in the informal market 
but also use informal loans to repay MFI debt.  
What can explain such coexistence of MFIs with informal money lenders? I develop a 
simple model to explore how informational asymmetries can constraint MFIs to raise 
its borrowers‘ payoff from borrowing MFI loans. As a result, some borrowers are 
always well off borrowing from informal money lenders, provided that the lender has 
better information about the project than MFIs do. Additionally, MFIs are also 
constrained with the fact the optimal contract they offer should also be able to screen 
good projects from the bad projects. The objective to screen good projects gives an 
incentive to raise the interest rate, and thereby reduces borrowers‘ incentive to borrow 
from MFIs. My model of optimal MFI contract under asymmetric information shows 
that the installment structure of the loan repayment schedule may allow the informal 
credit market to survive. My model also shows that informational constraint that MFIs 
have, reduces their ability to reduce poverty. I provide a brief literature review of the 
mixed evidence on MFIs‘ performance on poverty reduction. Many MFIs have been 
able to lend money to the poor in developing countries, while the poorest of the poor, 
generally, have not been reached.  
- 5 - 
 
Many microfinance programs are financially supported by governments and 
international organizations. When these financial resources terminate, it will be 
difficult for MFIs to maintain the operation of the microfinance programs. As a result 
of this, microfinance programs face resource constraints and are not self-sufficient 
(Meyer 2002). MFIs‘ ability to expand their service to the poor and the poorest of 
poor will be restrained. Therefore, microfinance institutions should find possible 
solutions to survive and not to depend so much on donors and governments. Thus, it 
is practically meaningful to explore and study the sustainability of MFIs. The thesis 
discusses the important issues related to financial sustainability and provides a review 
of the theoretical arguments from the existing literature. 
The thesis is organized as follows. In section 2, I provide the background and goals of 
microfinance movements. Section 3 develops the model based on informational 
asymmetry that can explain coexistence of informal lender and MFIs. Section 4 
overviews the poverty alleviating effect of microfinance. In section 5, I describe the 
issues related to sustainability. Section 6 concludes. 
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2 Microfinance movements  
2.1 Background  
The World Bank defines microfinance as a development tool through which 
government or non-governmental organizations and financial institutions provide a 
variety of financial services to help poor and low-income people. These financial 
services include microcredit, deposits, and micro-insurance and so on.  
Poor people need a diverse range of financial services to run their business, build 
assets, for smooth consumption and to manage risks. People living in poverty often 
meet their need for money through informal credit market. Credit is available from 
informal lenders, but usually at a very high cost for borrowers. To be worse, 
traditional banks do not necessarily consider poor people as their clients.  
The major concern for commercial banks is the high risk associated with small-scale 
lending to the poor. Due to the existence of adverse selection problem, banks cannot 
easily determine which customers are likely to be more risky than others. Banks 
would like to charge more interest rates to riskier borrowers in order to compensate 
for the added probability of default. However, the banks do not know who the riskier 
one is and raise interest rate for everyone which drives safer borrowers out of the 
credit market. Besides, the moral hazard problem also arises when borrowers try to 
abscond with the bank‘s money. If the bank has cheap ways to gather and evaluate 
information about their clients, these problems could be solved. But banks cannot 
afford the high transactions costs for gathering and evaluating information. Another 
potential solution would be available if borrowers had assets to offer as collateral. If 
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that were so, banks would lend without risk. Since the poor borrowers cannot provide 
collateral, poor people often are deprived of credit in market. 
Hulme & Mosley (1996) has pointed that ―The further one proceeds down the income 
spectrum, the harder it becomes to finance investment through borrowing from private 
banks, and the enterprises of the poor – both in rural areas and in the shanty towns on 
the edge of the cities – generally have no access to them at all.‖ They also emphasized 
two important problems that prevent the poor from having access to formal financial 
services. Firstly, it is the ‗screening problem‘. Banks may be discouraged from 
providing loans to the poor because they do not know them personally. It is easy to 
see why the banks consider it too risky to allow them to borrow money. Secondly, 
there is the ‗enforcement problem‘. Banks would not shield themselves from these 
risks, since these borrowers are generally too poor to offer collateral. 
The government has made significant efforts to combat the poverty. Policymakers 
have positively tried their best to extend financial markets in rural areas, but often 
with disappointing results. What is the government‘s role in microfinance? The 
government built development banks and gave them too much subsidies in order to 
support the rural economy. However, heavy subsides were deployed to compensate 
the banks for entering into markets where they fear  huge losses due to high 
transactions costs and risks (Morduch, 2005).  
India‘s Integrated Rural Development Program (IRDP) is an example of inefficient 
subsidized credit. This program has its ―social targets‖. In principle, the program 
provided 30 percent of loans to socially excluded groups and 30 percent toward 
women. Achieving social goals became as important as achieving efficiency. Between 
1979 and 1989, IRDP got subsidies of almost $6 billion. But these resources did not 
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generate good institutional performance. According to Pulley (1989), IRDP 
repayment rate fell below 60 percent. In 2000, the IRDP repayment rate decreased to 
31 percent (Meyer 2002).  Due to institutional performance remarkably weakened, the 
IRDP failed to be a reliable and meaningful source of service for the poor. 
The Consultation Group to Assist the Poorest (CGAP) points out ―there‘s a positive 
role for governments to play in adopting appropriate ―light-touch‖ consumer 
protection policies and market conduct regulation, such as disclosure requirements, 
protections against over- indebtedness, and simple, accessible recourse mechanisms, 
coupled with client financial education.‖ In addition, when microfinance providers 
offer voluntary deposit services, there is also a role for government to play in 
regulation and supervision. The reason for this is not only protecting depositors, but 
also to keep the stability of the financial system. 
Microfinance is a new way of delivering loans to poor borrowers. According to 
CGAP, a microfinance institution is an organization that provides comprehensive 
financial services to the poor. Different types of financial services providers have 
emerged: non-government organizations; cooperatives; community-based 
development institutions such as self-help groups and credit unions; members (group) 
system of collective organizations; rural savings and loan organizations; informal 
financial intermediaries; and semi-formal and formal financial institutions, including 
commercial banks offering new possibilities. These microfinance institutions differ in 
many aspects, including the range of offered products, ownership structures and 
sources and supply of funds. 
The target clients of these institutions are mainly the poor or low-income people 
(microenterprises included), especially the women of the poor farmers. The programs 
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of these MFIs are suitable for people in the rural areas. Microfinance provides the 
funds needed for production for poor households and solve the problem of funds for 
poverty alleviation, rather than consumer loans. Credit lines of microfinance are small 
and short-term. Microfinance is generally meets the seasonal production requirement 
for poor households (especially in rural poor households), and they are mostly short 
term loans (one year、3-6 months, etc.). The amount of loans which is mainly used to 
purchase the necessary means of production, small machinery equipment, is smaller. 
The most progress of microfinance is that there are no collateral or flexible and 
diverse forms of collateral, and carry out the installment repayment system. Because 
of the lack of the valuable assets that can be disposed after loan defaults, MFIs use the 
mode of installment repayment commonly. Thus, the entire loan and interest are 
decomposed into a week or once every two weeks to repay. One can continuously 
loan after repayment. So that is conducive to the recovery of loans, to some extent to 
reduce the risk of the loans, but they also help recycling funds, reducing the backlog 
of funds and improving interest income. 
 
2.2 Goals 
Previous researches have focused on different goals of microfinance and how they are 
achieved. In my thesis, I will pay attention to three main goals: (1) solving the market 
failure problem, (2) reducing poverty, and (3) bringing out development in a 
sustainable way.  
It is easy to see why one of microfinance‘s goals is to solve the market failure 
problem-reaching the poor and undeveloped sectors, and reducing exploitation by 
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informal moneylenders. The financial systems are not highly advanced in the poor 
regions of the world and the poor have little access to credit through formal credit 
sector. One of the reasons behind absence of formal credit sector is the information 
problem. In particular, banks have little information about the type of projects the 
poor people would invest in. Additionally, the poor people can hardly provide 
collateral for security. As loans from the formal banking sectors are often refused, the 
potential borrowers approach informal money lenders who provide loan at an 
extremely high interest rate, leading to further economic problem. The emergence of 
microfinance can possibly break this circle. Microfinance programs emphasize small, 
frequent, regular payments and create incentives for poor borrowers to make these 
payments. It has the promise to reduce the informal lending by providing financial 
services to the poor.  
With such a large proportion of the world‘s population living in poverty, the use of 
microfinance should also be a key to reduce poverty and encourage economic growth. 
It has many roles in reducing poverty. First, it targets the poorer section of the market, 
which is otherwise deprived of formal credit. Thereby it expands the market. Second, 
it converts savings of poor households to credit to others. Third, it works as a much 
needed insurance for the poor people, who otherwise have little support in smoothing 
consumption. Finally, it explores potential synergies between microcredit and other 
basic development services such as health care, education etc. Many MFIs have 
developed a range of services to address the requirement of the poor, such as the 
Income Generation for Vulnerable Group Development (IGVGD) program of BRAC, 
Bangladesh. CGAP‘s Poverty Assessment tool can be used to compare clients and no-
clients of MFIs in the same community. 
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Although the microfinance service provides huge support to help the poor people and 
change their life greatly, many present microfinance institutions cannot achieve 
financial sustainability. The main reason is that most institutions are still small and 
vulnerable to constraints on their funding resources. They are unable to continuously 
offer credit and wide-ranging service for the poor and thus have limited function on 
regional poverty alleviation. Therefore, another goal of microfinance is to bring out 
development in a sustainable way. Robinson (2000) has pointed ―The microfinance 
revolution is currently emerging in many countries around the world. This term refers 
to the large-scale, profitable provision of microfinance services-small savings and 
loans to economically active poor people by sustainable financial institutions.‖ This 
means MFIs should bring out development in a sustainable way, and then MFIs can 
offer large-scale provision of financial services to low-income people.  
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3 An Analytical Study 
In this section I develop a simple model of money lending. I first show how a 
borrower‘s reservation utility is related to informal money lender‘s capacity to offer 
loans. I assume that the informal money lender has a pure profit making objective, but 
she has her own cost of raising capital to offer loan. Additionally, I assume that the 
informal money lender has perfect information about the return from the project the 
borrower invests in. I characterize the minimum threshold on a borrower‘s reservation 
payoff that will make the informal money lender unable to offer loans.  
Next, I consider a formal MFI that can offer loan to the borrower but it has limited 
information about the return from the borrower‘s project. I assume that MFI, though a 
profit making entity, designs the lending contract with an interest to provide the 
borrower with a certain level of reservation payoff. In comparison to the informal 
money lender, the MFI has low cost of raising capital but has incomplete information 
about the project. I am interested to find when the reservation payoff that the 
borrower gets from the MFI loan exceeds the minimum threshold such that informal 
money lender can longer offer loan to such a borrower. 
Finally, I extend this model to more than one period. In the first period, MFI designs 
the lending contract to acquire information about the type of the project that the 
borrower invests in. When a high interest rate is charged, a successful repayment 
reveals information about the quality of project. I study the implication of screening 
on the MFIs ability to raise borrowers‘ reservation payoff, and in turn, to what extent 
informal money lending can be removed. 
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3.1 The model 
There are three players - a borrower, an MFI, and an informal money lender, labeled 
as B, M, and L respectively. B invests money in a project. The project has two 
possible outcomes: ‗high return‘ and ‗low return‘. If the project is a high return one, 
the borrower can get   𝑟𝑔   with the probability  µ  and   𝑟𝑚  with the probability (1-µ). 
On the other hand, if the project is a low return one, the borrower can get    𝑟𝑚   with 
the probability  µ  and 0  with the probability  (1-µ). We assume that    𝑟𝑔 > 𝑟𝑚 >0. 
3.1.1 Informal money lending  
I first consider the case when the informal money lender L lends money to the 
borrower B. L wants to maximize her profit. The borrower accepts the loan only if it 
gives him a utility level   𝑤. L is perfectly informed of the project‘s type. L offers a 
contract   (𝑘, 𝑠)  to B, where  𝑘  is the amount of the loan that is provided by informal 
lender, and   𝑠  is the interest rate charged by informal lender. For simplicity, I assume 
that B cannot default on the principal amount   𝑘, but can default on the interest rate   s. 
The informal lender has a cost of raising fund  𝑘, which is given by   𝐶𝐿 = 𝐶𝐿(𝑘) =
𝑐𝐿𝑘, where   𝑐𝐿  is a fixed positive number. 
Firstly, I consider the high return project. Therefore, L knows that the expected return 
from the project is given by  
 𝑟ℎ=µ𝑟𝑔  + (1-µ) 𝑟𝑚  
I denote   𝑈ℎ  as the utility of the borrower which is given by 
𝑈ℎ=  𝑘 (1+ 𝑟ℎ) –  𝑘 (1+s) 
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I denote   𝑉ℎ   as the lenders expected payoff which is given by 
𝑉ℎ=  𝑘 (1+s) –   𝑘 [1+𝐶𝐿(𝑘)] 
L‘s optimal contract solves the following optimization problem: 
𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑘 ,𝑠)  𝑘 (1 + 𝑠) –    𝑘 [1 + 𝐶𝐿(𝑘)]  
Subject to the B‘s participation constraint: 
 𝑘 (1 +  𝑟ℎ) –   𝑘 (1 + 𝑠) ≥ 𝑤 
The borrower‘s participation constraint can be simplified as  𝑘   𝑟ℎ  –  𝑠 ≥ 𝑤.  It is 
easy to show that this constraint is always binding otherwise L can simply increase  𝑠 
without affecting the participation constraint at all. Therefore, 
   s = 
 𝑘𝑟ℎ– 𝑤
𝑘
 
Therefore, the objective function can be described that 
𝑘 (1+  𝑟ℎ  )  –   𝑘[1 + 𝐶𝐿(𝑘)] –w     
The first order condition of informal lender‘s expected utility 
𝜕𝑉ℎ
𝜕𝑘
= 𝑟ℎ − 2𝑐𝐿  𝑘 =0 
We can solve   𝑘∗= 
𝑟ℎ
2𝑐𝐿
 
𝑠∗=𝑟ℎ −  
2𝑐𝐿𝑤  
𝑟ℎ
  
We finally consider the constraint that L has to earn non-negative profit; otherwise L  
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will not offer the contract at all. Therefore, we need  𝑘 (𝑟ℎ − 𝑐𝐿  𝑘) ≥ w 
𝑟ℎ
2𝑐𝐿
(𝑟ℎ − 𝑐𝐿
𝑟ℎ
2𝑐𝐿
) – w ≥ 0        
𝑟ℎ
2
4𝑐𝐿
 – w ≥ 0       𝑐𝐿  ≤ 𝑟ℎ
2/4w 
The above condition characterizes when we would see informal money lending, for a 
given cost of capital 𝑐𝐿 and borrower‘s reservation utility  𝑤. It is easy to see that if 
the cost is high or the reservation utility is high, the volume of informal money 
lending reduces. The above condition can be rewritten as  𝑤 ≤ 𝑟ℎ
2/4𝑐𝐿  . We 
therefore define the reservation utility threshold for high return project by   𝑟ℎ
2/4𝑐𝐿 . 
If a borrower with high return project has a reservation utility above this threshold, 
the informal money lender can no longer offer loans to such a borrower. 
The above analysis is done for the high return project. A similar analysis can also be 
done for the low return project, which has an expected return given by  𝑟𝑙=µ𝑟𝑚 . The 
reservation utility threshold for low return project is given by  𝑟𝑙
2/4𝑐𝐿. The following 
proposition summarizes our main findings. 
Proposition 1:  Assume that the informal money lender has perfect information about 
the return from the project. Consider the high return project with expected 
return  𝑟ℎ = µ𝑟𝑔 + (1 − µ)𝑟𝑚 . The informal money lender provides loans if and only 
if  𝑐𝐿  ≤ 𝑟ℎ
2/4w. For high return project, the optimal contract is (
𝑟ℎ
2𝑐𝐿
, 𝑟ℎ −  
2𝑐𝐿𝑤  
𝑟ℎ
). 
Similarly, for low return projects with expected return  𝑟𝑙=µ𝑟𝑚 , the informal money 
lender provides loans if and only if 𝑐𝐿  ≤ 𝑟𝑙
2/4w. The informal money lender‘s 
optimal contract for low return project is ( 
𝑟𝑙
2𝑐𝐿
, 𝑟𝑙 −  
2𝑐𝐿𝑤  
𝑟𝑙
). 
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3.1.2 Money lending by MFIs with incomplete information 
In this section I consider the optimal lending contract offered by the MFI, M. I 
assume that M does not have perfect information about the project‘s return. Instead, it 
has the prior belief that the borrower has a high return project with probability 𝑝, and 
the borrower has a low return project with probability (1- 𝑝). We treat MFI as a 
profit-making entity, but it wishes to keep the reservation payoff of the borrower at a 
certain level w. We are interested to find out whether the reservation payoff w in this 
case can exceed the reservation utility threshold that we obtained in case of informal 
money lending.  
As M does not have perfect information, it offers a menu of contract {(𝑘ℎ
∗  , 𝑠ℎ
∗), 
(𝑘𝑙
∗ , 𝑠𝑙
∗)} expecting that a borrower with high return project will select   𝑘ℎ
∗  , 𝑠ℎ
∗   and 
a borrower with low return will select  (𝑘𝑙
∗ , 𝑠𝑙
∗). We also assume that M has a cost of 
raising fund  𝑘, which is given by   𝐶𝑀 = 𝐶𝑀(𝑘) = 𝑐𝑀𝑘, where  𝑐𝑀  is a fixed positive 
number. We consider the case  𝑐𝑀 < 𝑐𝐿  , so that M has lower cost of raising fund than 
an informal money lender does. 
M‘s optimal menu of contract solves the following optimization problem: 
𝑚𝑎𝑥{(𝑘ℎ∗  ,𝑠ℎ∗ ),(𝑘𝑙∗ ,𝑠𝑙∗)} 𝑝[𝑘ℎ( 𝑠 ℎ − 𝑐𝑀𝑘ℎ)]+ (1- 𝑝) [𝑘𝑙(𝑠𝑙−𝑐𝑀𝑘𝑙)] 
Subject to:  
MFI‘s break-even constraint: 
𝑝[𝑘ℎ( 𝑠 ℎ − 𝑐𝑀𝑘ℎ)] + (1- 𝑝) [𝑘𝑙(𝑠𝑙−𝑐𝑀𝑘𝑙)] ≥ 0    
Borrower‘s participation constraints: 
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𝑘ℎ(𝑟ℎ −  𝑠 ℎ) ≥ w   (1) 
𝑘𝑙  (𝑟𝑙 − 𝑠 𝑙  ≥ w    (2) 
Borrower‘s incentive-compatibility constraints: 
𝑘ℎ(𝑟ℎ −  𝑠 ℎ) ≥ 𝑘𝑙  (𝑟ℎ − 𝑠 𝑙)   (3) 
𝑘𝑙  (𝑟𝑙 − 𝑠 𝑙  ≥ 𝑘ℎ(𝑟𝑙 −  𝑠 ℎ)    (4) 
First note that the participation constraint of the borrower with low return project and 
the incentive-compatibility constraint of the borrower with high return project will be 
binding. Indeed, when the borrower with low return project can get loan from MFI, so 
the borrower with high return project can always mimic the low type. Therefore, we 
can get (2) and (3) which are binding. 
𝑘𝑙  (𝑟𝑙 − 𝑠 𝑙) −w = 0     𝑠 𝑙 = 𝑟𝑙 −
𝑤
𝑘𝑙
      (5) 
𝑘ℎ(𝑟ℎ −  𝑠 ℎ) -𝑘𝑙  (𝑟ℎ − 𝑠 𝑙) =0      𝑠 ℎ = 𝑟ℎ −
𝑘𝑙  𝑟ℎ
𝑘ℎ
 + 
𝑘𝑙  𝑟𝑙
𝑘ℎ
 −
𝑤
𝑘ℎ
     (6) 
Using the two binding constraints to eliminate  𝑠 ℎ  and 𝑠 𝑙  from the maximizing 
problem, we can change objective function into 
max
{(𝑘ℎ
∗  ,𝑠ℎ
∗ ),(𝑘𝑙
∗ ,𝑠𝑙
∗)}
 𝑝[(𝑘ℎ𝑟ℎ  –𝑘𝑙𝑟ℎ+ 𝑘𝑙𝑟𝑙 − 𝑤 − 𝑘ℎ𝑐𝑀(𝑘ℎ))] +(1- 𝑝) [𝑘𝑙𝑟𝑙  –𝑤 − 𝑘𝑙𝑐𝑀(𝑘𝑙)] 
Following the first order condition, we can get  
𝑘ℎ
∗ =
𝑟ℎ
2𝑐𝑀
     (7) 
𝑘𝑙
∗ =
𝑟𝑙−𝑝𝑟ℎ
2(1−𝑝)𝑐𝑀
   (8)    
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From (5) and (6), we can get  
𝑠𝑙
∗ =
𝑟𝑙
2−𝑟𝑙𝑝𝑟ℎ−2𝑤+2𝑝𝑤 𝑐𝑀
𝑟𝑙−𝑝𝑟ℎ
    
𝑠ℎ
∗ = 𝑟ℎ −
(𝑟𝑙−𝑝𝑟ℎ )(𝑟ℎ−𝑟𝑙)
(1−𝑝)𝑟ℎ
 –  
𝑤2𝑐𝑀
𝑟ℎ  
     
Next, we look at MFI‘s expected payoff from offering this menu of contracts.  
𝜋𝑀 = 𝑝 𝑘ℎ𝑟ℎ − 𝑘𝑙𝑟ℎ +  𝑘𝑙𝑟𝑙 − 𝑘ℎ
2𝑐𝑀 +  1 − 𝑝  𝑘𝑙𝑟𝑙 − 𝑘𝑙
2𝑐𝑀 −  𝑤  
= 𝑝𝑘ℎ 𝑟ℎ − 𝑘ℎ𝑐𝑀 +  𝑘𝑙(𝑟𝑙 − 𝑝𝑟ℎ−𝑘𝑙𝑐𝑀) −  𝑤  
=
𝑝𝑟ℎ
2
4𝑐𝑀
+
(𝑟𝑙−𝑝𝑟ℎ )
2
4(1−𝑝)𝑐𝑀
 −  𝑤  
After simplifying the above expression, we can  
Proposition 2: The MFI offers the menu of contract if and only if  𝑤 ≤
𝑝𝑟ℎ
2
4𝑐𝑀
+
(𝑟𝑙−𝑝𝑟ℎ )
2
4(1−𝑝)𝑐𝑀
. The optimal menu of contract is given by { (𝑘ℎ
∗  , 𝑠ℎ
∗) , (𝑘𝑙
∗ , 𝑠𝑙
∗) } where 
𝑘ℎ
∗ =
𝑟ℎ
2𝑐𝑀
, 𝑠ℎ
∗ = 𝑟ℎ −
(𝑟𝑙−𝑝𝑟ℎ )(𝑟ℎ−𝑟𝑙)
(1−𝑃)𝑟ℎ
 –  
𝑤2𝑐𝑀
𝑟ℎ  
 , and 𝑘𝑙
∗ =
𝑟𝑙−𝑝𝑟ℎ
2(1−𝑝)𝑐𝑀
 ,  
𝑠𝑙
∗ =
𝑟𝑙
2−𝑟𝑙𝑝𝑟ℎ−2𝑤+2𝑝𝑤 𝑐𝑀
𝑟𝑙−𝑝𝑟ℎ
 . 
The above proposition has many implications. First we see that if   𝑝 ≥
𝑟𝑙
𝑟ℎ
 , then   𝑘𝑙
∗  
is negative, implying that for large enough values of  𝑝 , the MFI will abstain from 
providing any loan to low return projects.  
Second we ask the question what would be the maximum reservation payoff that MFI 
can sustain? In particular, we are interested to see whether or not MFI can sustain a 
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reservation payoff as high as the reservation utility threshold that would remove 
informal money lenders from the market. 
We know that for the low return project, the borrower gets her reservation payoff 
which is exactly  𝑤. And for the high return project, the borrower gets a premium over 
the reservation payoff, and is given by  𝑘𝑙 𝑟ℎ − 𝑠 𝑙 = 𝑘𝑙 𝑟𝑙 − 𝑠 𝑙 + 𝑘𝑙 𝑟ℎ − 𝑟 𝑙 =
𝑤 + 𝑘𝑙 𝑟ℎ − 𝑟 𝑙 = 𝑤 +  𝑟ℎ − 𝑟 𝑙 
𝑟𝑙−𝑝𝑟ℎ
2(1−𝑝)𝑐𝑀
 .  
From Proposition 2, we know that the maximum value of w that can be sustained is  
𝑝𝑟ℎ
2
4𝑐𝑀
+
(𝑟𝑙−𝑝𝑟ℎ )
2
4(1−𝑝)𝑐𝑀
 . Comparing this expression with the reservation utility threshold for 
low return project that we obtained in case of informal money lending, we conclude 
that if   𝑟𝑙
2/𝑐𝐿 ≤ 
𝑝𝑟ℎ
2
4𝑐𝑀
+
(𝑟𝑙−𝑝𝑟ℎ )
2
4(1−𝑝)𝑐𝑀
 , MFI has the potential to remove informal money 
lending for low return projects. Similarly, if 𝑟ℎ
2/𝑐𝐿 ≤
𝑝𝑟ℎ
2
4𝑐𝑀
+
(𝑟𝑙−𝑝𝑟ℎ )
2
4(1−𝑝)𝑐𝑀
+  𝑟ℎ −
𝑟 𝑙 
𝑟𝑙−𝑝𝑟ℎ
2(1−𝑝)𝑐𝑀
 , MFI has the potential to remove informal money lending for high return 
projects. As it turns out both possibility may cease to exist for intermediate values of 
p even if  𝑐𝐿 > 𝑐𝑀  . Thus informational problem can constraint MFI‘s ability to 
remove informal money lending. 
 
3.2 Learning through contract  
In the previous section, we consider MFI‘s information about the project exogenous. 
In particular, we solve the case for any general value of p. In reality, MFI can learn 
about the project type through repeated interaction with the borrower. In this section, 
we consider the possibility that MFI has actually interact with the borrower more than 
- 20 - 
 
one times, and therefore, can screen out high return projects from the low return 
projects through optimal repayment schedule. At the beginning, both M and B do not 
have information about the project. M specifies his contract ( 𝑘1,𝑠1 ). The project has 
two possible outcomes: ‗high return‘ and ‗low return‘. As before, for the high return 
project, the borrower can get  𝑟𝑔  with the probability µ and  𝑟𝑚  with the probability  
(1-µ). For the low return project, the borrower can get  𝑟𝑚  with the probability µ and 
0 with the probability (1-µ). Both M and B have no information about the project‘s 
type. The prior belief is that it is a high return project with probability 𝑝, and it is a 
low return project with probability (1-  𝑝). We are interested to find out what kind of 
posterior belief M will have based on repayment. 
I denote w is the reservation utility of borrower. I denote the borrower‘s expected 
return   𝑟1 = 𝑝µ𝑟𝑔 +  𝑝 (1-µ) 𝑟𝑚 + (1 − 𝑝) µ𝑟𝑚 . And MFI is assumed to had a cost 
function 𝐶𝑀= 𝑐𝑀  (𝑘) =𝑐𝑀  𝑘. 
MFI chooses a contract so as to maximize profit, subject to borrower‘s participation 
constraint.  
𝑚𝑎𝑥
{( 𝑘1 ,𝑠1  )}
𝑘1 1 + 𝑠1 − 𝑘1[1 + 𝑐𝑀  (𝑘1)] 
Subject to: 
Borrower‘s participation constraint: 
𝑘1𝑟1-𝑘1𝑠1 ≥ w 
This constraint is always strictly satisfied. From 𝑘1𝑟1-𝑘1𝑠1 = w, we get  
𝑘1𝑠1 = 𝑘1𝑟1 − 𝑤     
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Insert 𝑘1𝑠1 = 𝑘1𝑟1 − 𝑤   into the objective function, the objective function can be 
simplified as  
𝑚𝑎𝑥
{(𝑘1 ,𝑠1)}
𝑘1𝑟1 − 𝑤 − 𝑐𝑀    𝑘1
2 
Take the first order condition, we can get  
𝑘1= 
𝑟1
2𝑐𝑀
 
Hence, MFI‘s return can be implied as   
𝑘1𝑟1 − 𝑤 − 𝑐𝑀𝑘1
2= 𝑘1(𝑟1 − 𝑐𝑀𝑘1) –𝑤=  𝑘1(𝑟1 −
𝑟1
2
) –𝑤      
 𝑘1
𝑟1
2
− 𝑤 = 
𝑟1
2
4𝑐𝑀
 −𝑤 
If  
𝑟1
2
4𝑐𝑀
 ≥ 𝑤, MFI provides loan to borrower. Or in other words, it can raise borrower‘s 
reservation utility w up to  
𝑟1
2
4𝑐𝑀
. In addition, if MFI has poverty alleviation motivation, 
then it is constrained by the condition   
𝑟1
2
4𝑐𝑀
 ≥ 𝑤. 
From 𝑘1𝑠1 = 𝑘1𝑟1 − 𝑤  , we can get  𝑠1 =
𝑘1𝑟1−𝑤
𝑘1
 
  𝑠1 = 𝑟1 − 
𝑤
𝑘1
  
We can easily find  𝑠1 less than  𝑟1. Since 𝑟1= pµ𝑟𝑔 +  (𝑝 + µ− 2𝑝µ)𝑟𝑚 , it is clearly, 
to find  𝑠1 ≤𝑟1 <𝑟𝑔 , and  𝑟1 even can be less than  𝑟𝑚 . 
We are now in a position to study what type of information can be revealed through 
repayment.  
- 22 - 
 
Firstly, if  𝑠1 ≤𝑟𝑚 , then the MFI gets two types of information about the borrower‘s 
return. That is, borrower get return either 0 or  𝑠1. 
In this situation, given the borrower‘s return is  𝑠1, the posterior probability of MFI 
that the project is high return is  𝑝∗, where 
p*=p(h|𝑠1) =
𝑝 ℎ 𝑝(𝑠1|ℎ)
𝑝 ℎ 𝑝 𝑠1 ℎ +𝑝 𝑙 𝑝(𝑠1|𝑙)
=  
𝑃
𝑃+ 1−𝑃 µ 
    
Proposition 3: If   𝑠1 ≤  𝑟𝑚 , MFI considers the high-return project with probability  𝑝
∗. 
And then at the following period, MFI would like to provide the contract   𝑘ℎ
∗  , 𝑠ℎ
∗   to 
the borrower. Otherwise, if borrower‘s return is 0, the MFI believes that the project is 
low return. Hence, MFI will provide the contract   𝑘𝑙
∗ , 𝑠𝑙
∗  to the borrower.  
Secondly, if  𝑟𝑔 > 𝑠1 > 𝑟𝑚 , the MFI knows perfectly that it is a high return project. 
However, if MFI observes payment up to  𝑟𝑚 , it believes that the project is high return 
with probability 𝑝∗∗, where 
 𝑝∗∗= p (h|𝑟𝑚 ) =
𝑝 ℎ 𝑝(𝑟𝑚 |ℎ)
𝑝 ℎ 𝑝 𝑟𝑚  ℎ +𝑝 𝑙 𝑝(𝑟𝑚 |𝑙)
  = 
𝑃(1−µ)
𝑃(1−µ)+ 1−𝑃 µ
=
𝑃
𝑃+
 1−𝑃 µ 
(1−µ)
 
 
Intuitively, we can get  𝑝∗∗ <  𝑝∗. That is to say, the probability for the MFI considers 
that the project is high return on the condition that the repayment up to   𝑟𝑚  less than 
the probability for the MFI believes that the project is high return with the condition 
of  𝑠1 ≤𝑟𝑚 . 
Proposition 4: If  𝑟𝑔 > 𝑠1 > 𝑟𝑚 , MFI believes the project with high return perfectly. 
And MFI considers the high project with probability 𝑝∗∗ under the condition of the 
payment up to  𝑟𝑚 . In terms of different payment, the MFI would provide different 
optimal contact to borrower.  
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In the current period, although MFI has partial information of project, the MFI can 
estimate and provide the optimal contract by observing the borrower‘s repayment. As 
for informal money lender, when the borrower‘s utility level from MFI bigger than  
𝑟ℎ
2
4𝑐𝐿
  for the high return project, the informal lender will away from the business. For 
the low return project, the informal lender will out of business when the borrower‘s 
utility level from MFI bigger than  
𝑟𝑙
2
4𝑐𝐿
 . 
 
3.3 Role of regularly scheduled repayment 
Jain & Mausuri (2003) provides another explanation why regularly scheduled 
repayments by MFIs can allow informal money lenders to survive. They pointed out 
―The potential for moral hazard leads MFIs to use innovative mechanisms, such as 
regularly scheduled repayments, which indirectly co-opt the better-informed informal 
lenders, and this installment repayment structure allows informal lenders to survive‖. 
The installment repayment plan requires that borrowers must pay back their loan at 
fixed period. Since the borrower know that repayment must begin almost immediately 
after loan disbursement, and typically much before the returns are realized, they must 
have enough money to finance the installment. Therefore, the borrowers might 
borrow from informal lenders. In addition, the rigid repayment schedule considerably 
restricts the range of the borrower‘s project, and then reduces the attraction of loan. 
Sinha and Matin (1998) suggested that the use of small informal loans to meet the 
weekly installment of the MFI loan is more common among the poorest MFI 
borrowers. 
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In fact, the presence of the informal money lending can mitigate the informational 
problems in an installment repayment plan that MFI provides. The reason is that the 
installment plan allows the MFI to make use of the superior monitoring capability of 
the informal money lender. The informal money lender with perfect information of 
borrowers can use his monitoring capacity to monitor the borrowers. The installment 
repayment is a good way of mitigating the information problems faced by the MFI. 
Jain & Mausuri (2003) also showed that the opening up of a formal microfinance 
institution in a village may lead to an increase in borrowing from the informal money 
lenders. And as a result, the informal money lender may increase their interest rate. In 
addition, they established that the installment plan does better than cofinancing which 
requires the borrower to raise part of the loan elsewhere. 
Microfinance practitioners argue that the repayment schedule is critical to prevent 
loan default. It is believed that repayment installment schedule play a role in reducing 
default risk and making lending to the poor viable. However, this practice 
dramatically increases MFI transactions costs, thereby limiting the set of loan sizes 
and client types. In addition, the use of regular scheduled repayment allows the 
informal money lenders to survive. Regular scheduled repayment is a good 
explanation for coexistence of the MFI and informal money lenders. 
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4 Poverty Reductions 
Poverty can be defined as an income level below a socially acceptable minimum 
(Montgomery, 2005). To understand poverty, a simple distinction can be noticed. 
There are ‗chronic poor‘ and ‗transitory poor‘3. The chronic poor always stay in 
poverty, without welfare support. Those poor people lack assets and opportunities.  
Whereas the transitory poor, those are suffer fluctuations in income that bring them 
close to or below the poverty line. In other words, those people temporarily fall into 
poverty due to adverse shocks. 
In the world, poverty remains a serious problem because the high economic growth is 
mainly driven by few rich and developed countries. According to the estimated data 
by the World Bank in 2008, there was the estimated number of 1,345 billion poor 
people in developing countries who live on US$1.25 a day at 2005 international 
prices
4
. Extreme poverty remains an alarming problem in the developing regions 
around the world. There are still a lot of people suffered ‗chronic poor‘ or ‗transitory 
poor‘. To help them and to combat poverty is a matter of growing concern by 
government. Many governments have responded positively to this concern by 
implementing all kinds of possible policies. The World Bank (2000) explained that 
the condition of poverty is characterized by lack of access by poor households or 
individuals to the necessary assets for a higher standard of income or welfare, whether 
assets contain access to education, access to land, assess to infrastructure, access to 
networks of obligations or access to credit. 
5
(Montgomery, 2005) 
                                        
3 Source: Heather Montgomery and John Weiss(2005) ― Great Expectations: Microfinance and Poverty Reduction 
in Asia and Latin America‖  p5 
4 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.DDAY 
5http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/apcity/unpan035366.pdf 
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Policymakers and economists around the world always emphasize the link between 
improving access to financial markets and reducing poverty, because lack of access to 
finance is often considered as a key reason why poor people remain poor. Few recent 
ideas have generated as much hope for alleviating poverty in low-income countries as 
the idea of microfinance. The original objective of microfinance is to help the low-
income people and improve the position of the poor. It is easy to understand that 
microfinance is used as a mechanism for poverty reduction. The poor are always 
refused by conventional financial banks, because they cannot afford collateral. Due to 
the lack of access to credit from conventional financial institutions, the poor relies on 
loans from informal moneylenders at high interest rates. In this sense, poverty has 
reproduced poverty for generations.  
Microfinance institutions attempt to help the poor through innovative measures such 
as group lending and regular saving schemes and so on. Microfinance increases the 
options and self-confidence of poor people by helping them to access credit. If access 
to credit can be improved, the poor can finance productive activities that will help 
income growth. Microfinance is related to the chronic poor and to the transitory poor 
in different ways. As for access to credit, there is a simple distinction between the 
needs of the chronic and transitory poor. The chronic poor often access credit for the 
purpose of creating income, whereas the transitory poor want to realize smoothing 
consumption through access to credit. The policies which help households to smooth 
income can dramatically reduce transitory poverty. But only large and sustained 
growth in household incomes will reduce the long-term poverty.  
There is general evidence that microfinance has a positive impact on the poverty 
reduction. Remenyi and Benjamin (2000) gave the conclusion that household income 
of families with access to credit is significantly higher than that of comparable 
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households without access to credit based on case studies from Asia and the Pacific.  
Robinson (2001) emphasized in her book: ―Among the economically active poor of 
the developing world, there is strong demand for small-scale commercial financial 
services-for both credit and savings. Where available, these and other financial 
services help low income people improved household and enterprise management, 
increase productivity, smoothing income flows and consumption cost, enlarge and 
diversify their micro business and increase their incomes.‖  
Khandker (2005) confirmed that microfinance programs have an important effect on 
reducing poverty among the participants, particularly for female participants and 
positive spillovers on non-program participants in the villages. Mosley and Arun 
(2003) demonstrated that a variety of state sponsored institutions provided financial 
services, which resulted in impressive achievements in expanding access to credit 
particularly among the rural poor. Katsushi, Thankom & S.K. Annim(2010)  used 
national household data from India and developed treatment effect model to estimate 
the poverty-reducing effects of MFIs loans for productive purposes. They found that 
―loans for productive purposes were more important for poverty reduction in rural 
than in urban areas, however in urban areas, simple access to MFIs has larger average 
poverty-reducing effects than access to loans from MFIs for productive purpose.‖ 
According to the survey from Microfinance Information Exchange (MIX) in 2009, 
there are more than 1400 MFIs, representing 86 million borrowers and almost 100 
million savers from throughout the developing world
6
. Nevertheless, most parts of the 
developing world still remain characterized by the huge demand for micro financial 
                                        
6 Source: MIX Annual Report FY 2009.  
http://www.themix.org/sites/default/files/Annual%20Report%202009_0.pdf 
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services. Obviously, microfinance is weak to reach the core poor people who live 
significantly below the poverty line and lack complementary inputs. 
The reasons are as follows: Firstly, due to the high cost, most microfinance 
institutions charge higher and higher interest rates. Such high rates are unaffordable to 
the core poor. Once the core poor cannot accept high interest rates, they will either 
give up the service or accept it but then get into financial difficulties. Secondly, the 
very poor may be excluded by other members of the group in group lending. The 
reason is that the very poor are considered bad credit risk. They would jeopardize the 
position of the group as a whole.  Thirdly, when professional staffs operate the loan, 
they may exclude the very poor from borrowing because of the fear of defaulting. 
Amin et al. (2003) pointed that microfinance programs are more successful at 
reaching poor, but less successful at reaching vulnerable.  
Wright (2000) noted ―there is increasing acceptance that traditional microfinance 
programs are not reaching the ‗poorest of the poor‘-indeed they are rarely reaching 
the bottom 10-15% of the population.‖ He pointed out that a MFI‘s ability to attract 
the poorest depends on whether the financial service it offers is appropriate for the 
needs of the poorest of the poor. Coleman (2006) has shown that microfinance 
programs are not reaching the poor as much as they reach relatively wealthy people in 
Thailand. And the impact of village banks is larger on richer committee members 
rather than on rank-and-file members. The concept and practice of microfinance have 
changed over the last decade.  Hulme and Arun (2009) indicated that microfinance 
sector is increasingly adopting a financial system approach. This approach supports 
the argument that MFIs should aim for sustainable financial services to low income 
people, which may risk undermining the potential of institutional innovation for 
poverty reduction and social empowerment (Katsushi et al., 2010). Most MFIs 
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probably do not consider their institutional mission to be serving the poorest of the 
poor. From the report of MIX, minority MFIs identified ―specifically targeting very 
poor clients‖ as their institutional mission.  
How can the microfinance reach to the core poor? To answer this question, many 
aspects should be considered. Firstly, for the government part, government should 
encourage more MFIs to extend their loans and financial services to the poorest of the 
poor. Government should also make some policies to improve basic education, basic 
health care and infrastructure construction in poor region, thereby MFIs can easily 
reach to these poor regions. Secondly, for the MFIs part, MFIs should design special 
programs for the core poor. The degree to which the programs meet the core poor 
people‘s needs lie in the characteristics of the programs for them. The well known 
institution is the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC)
7
 in Bangladesh. 
The programs specially aim to provide training, health provision and more social 
development for the core poor. It combines credit with training, food subsidies, and 
other support. The core poor are encouraged to realize their potential through 
economic and social programs.  
The efficacy of microfinance as a poverty intervention tool may be related to the 
sustainable development by itself. The MFI not only targets the poor, but also 
continues to serve them. For the purpose of being successful, the MFIs must be self-
sustaining. As long as MFIs keep themselves sustainable, they can offer sustainable 
service to the poor. The fundamental objective of sustainable microfinance is to be 
able to continue to serve poor populations. Large-scale sustainable microfinance helps 
to create an enabling environment for the poverty reduction. Sustainable microfinance 
                                        
7 BRAC started out in Bangladesh in 1972. It is a development organization dedicated to alleviating poverty by 
empowering the poor to bring about change in their own lives. 
- 30 - 
 
expands the service scope, scale and depth, through the realization of financial 
sustainability and improves efficiency of alleviating poverty. 
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5 Sustainable Microfinance  
5.1 Overview of Sustainability 
Microfinance has been an integral part of the financial system, and the successful 
experience of microfinance is also being learned by many countries. By constant 
practice and development of microfinance, more and more people pay their attention 
on the ability of the sustainable development of MFIs. These sustainable MFIs can 
service a wide range of the poor people because they can ensure their development by 
providing long-term financial services. In the international microfinance experience, 
sustainability gradually becomes an important standard to evaluate the success of a 
micro-financial institution.  
Though the present microfinance service in practice gives strong support to help the 
poor and improve their life to a certain extent， the present MFIs are unable to 
achieve financial sustainability since most institutions are still small and vulnerable to 
constraints on their funding resources, which makes them unable to continuously 
provide credit and comprehensive service for the poor and thus have limited function 
on regional poverty alleviation.  
We can understand the concept of sustainable development in microfinance from two 
aspects. The first is organizational sustainability. This means that the MFI has to 
focus on management, organizational structure and hiring of motivated staff. (Johnson 
& Rogaly, 1997). The second is financial sustainability. The microfinance institutions‘ 
revenue generated by their own credit services can cover their transaction costs and 
capital costs to ensure that the profit is higher than the expenditure. To achieve this 
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level, the institutions will not need to be provided with any subsidies, and then their 
own investments will grantee profit.  
Financial sustainability is very important to the survival and development of 
microfinance. Microfinance as a financial service available to the poor is reflected in a 
credit relationship. Credit contains lending, supervision of loan use and repayment of 
the loan. Financial sustainability of microfinance generally experience four 
development stages: In the first stage, the operating cost is mainly paid by donors and 
―soft loans‖. In the second stage, the value of funding sources close to the market 
price, loan interest income can compensate capital cost and a part of operation cost. In 
the third stage, subsidies greatly reduced, and the ability of operational self-
sufficiency continuously enhanced. In the fourth stage, microfinance institutions 
absorb deposits at commercial interest rates; the interest income can sufficiently cover 
the operating cost, the losses of loans and inflation. 
 
5.2 Subsidy and Sustainability 
The role of subsidy in MFIs cannot be under-estimated. The truth is that numerous of 
the MFIs continue to use subsidies from a variety of sources—some from donors, 
some from governments, and some from charities and concerned individuals. 
Financial self-sufficiency is referred to the revenue that covers nonfinancial and 
financial expenses calculated on a commercial basis. Sometimes also refer to as 
―profit without subsidy‖ (Christen and others, 1995). Sustainability requires MFIs to 
have a positive return on equity (net of any subsidy received) while covering all 
transaction costs (loan losses, financial costs, administrative costs, etc), and 
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consequently to function without subsidies.(Ahmad Nawaz, 2010). What are the 
debates about subsidy? A lot of studies have focused on the impact of subsidy, but 
there are some competing views. Here are some conclusions as follows: 
---Subsidy can impact credit demand and supply. There are two conflicting effects. 
One is that demand for loans by current borrowers may fall when interest rates rise, 
which is a standard result from demand theory. The second effect is that as programs 
loosen themselves from subsidies, they can increase the supply of loans to the 
underserved, delivering the opposite result. 
---Subsidy also impacts average returns to borrowers. Raising the interest rates leads 
to screening out poor projects and increasing average returns. In contrast, raising the 
interest rates will exacerbate moral hazard and adverse selection, and result in worsen 
net returns. 
---Subsidy impacts nonsubsidized lenders, who may change their interest rates. The 
subsidized lenders squeeze out other lenders, so that removing subsidies should both 
expand overall credit supply and allow those lenders to raise their rates. Otherwise, 
the subsidized lenders helpfully segment the credit market; and when subsides fall, 
other lenders may be forced to lower their rates given a more diverse pool of potential 
clients. 
---Subsidy impacts poverty reduction. Advocates think MFIs without subsidy can get 
sustainable development. As long as MFIs keep sustainability, they can effectively 
play a role in poverty reduction. On the contrary, some people insist on emphasizing 
financial sustainability above other concerns can result in the exclusion of the poorest, 
most vulnerable people, and those living in isolated areas from financial services.  
- 34 - 
 
Some insists that subsidization tend to put greater social power on consumption by the 
poor. They assume that there are highly sensitive credit demand to interest rates, low 
impacts of interest rates on returns, but not extremely high returns to investments by 
poor households, and small or beneficial spillovers onto other lenders. On the other 
hand, those who are against subsidization tend to support a relatively flat distribution 
of social weights. They think that there are low sensitivity of credit demand to interest 
rates, positive impacts of interest rate on returns, very low returns to investments by 
poor households, and negative externalities of subsidized credit programs on other 
lenders. Those who are skeptical about subsidization consider that the role of the 
subsidies still persists which hinders the MFIs to achieve self-sustainability. 
(Morduch, 2005) 
Some experts persist in an opinion of ‘win-win’ proposition: microfinance reduces 
poverty and in the process of that becomes subsidy free or sustainable. Microfinance 
institutions will be able to grow without the constraints imposed by donor budgets. 
Morduch (2000) pointed that there is no ‗win-win‘ situation in which an MFI can get 
the best of both sides of this debate. Ahmad Nawaz (2010) did the ―with and without 
subsidy‖ analysis of conventional financial ratios and confirmed the fact that MFIs 
financial performance declines substantially without subsidies.  
By understanding the role of subsidies in microfinance, one might want to quantify 
whether the subsidies are used well or not and to know how large the subsidies are. 
Any subsidy to the institution means that fewer costs have to be charged to customers.  
For example, the Grameen Bank, despite of reporting profits, it is in fact subsidized 
on a continuing basis (Morduch, 1999). Grameen‘s annual reports indicated that it has 
earned profits every year and the sum of profits were up to $1.5 million between 1985 
and 1996. But during this period, Grameen also got subsidies from all kinds of 
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sources. According to the report by Grameen, their direct subsidies totaled $16.4 
million between 1985 and 1996. It is clear that Grameen Bank took in more revenue 
than it spent. By subtracting the $16.4 million in grants from the $1.5 million reported 
profits, we can see that in this period Grameen clearly did not earn profits as 
calculated traditionally. In addition, there are other forms of subsidy from ―soft loans‖ 
from donors. 
Sustainability means the extent to which an institution, in addition to being viable, 
mobilize its own financial resources internally (equity, savings deposit, and retained 
profits) instead of depending on government subsidies or donor funds.(Seibel, 1999). 
Different from traditional finance institutions, microfinance institutions not only 
combat for financial sustainability but also reduce poverty. This social nature of MFIs 
is mainly financed by subsidies from donors. The social welfare concept associated 
with MFIs along with the shift towards commercialization warrants that their 
performance on the basis of traditional financial ratios without unearthing their degree 
of subsidy dependence provides only a partial and often meaningless or misleading 
picture of the social cost of maintaining the MFIs (Yaron, 2004). 
The Microbanking Bulletin (2009) showed that 557 out of 1084 microfinance 
institutions surveyed were financially sustainable, a rate just over 50 percent.
8
 From 
the data, we can draw that subsidy is very important for MFIs. However, if MFIs 
would like to achieve the sustainable development, they should find a new way to free 
from the subsidies. Morduch (2005) highlights that some donors argue for a strategy 
which is ―subsidize start-up costs, not ongoing operations‖. We can consider a long-
term situation where the institution can be financially self-sufficient. The institution 
charges an interest rate as 30 percent per year to customers. But, in the first ten years, 
                                        
8 Source: The MicroBanking Bulletin, NO. 19, December 2009. 
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the 30 percent interest rate cannot cover all costs. In fact, the lender should charge an 
interest rate as 45 percent. Then, the strategy here would be to charge the customer 30 
percent from the first day of operation and to take a subsidy of fifteen cents per dollar 
lent for the first ten years.  
The following figure shows subsidies for start-up costs.  
Figure 5.1 
9
  
  
This figure describes initial costs start at r0 but fall steadily until time  t
∗, at which 
time costs have reached the long-term level  r∗. A subsidy that covers all costs greater 
than   r∗ that are incurred before   t∗ allows the program to charge borrowers interest 
rates of   r∗ from the very start of operations. After time  t∗, the program can continue 
to charge customers   r∗  and exactly cover the ongoing costs of lending without 
subsidy. The initial subsidies mean that the customers do not have to help shoulder 
start-up costs. (Morduch, 2005) 
                                        
9 Source: Beatriz Amendariz & Jonathan Morduch (2005) “The economics of microfinance” p246 
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Majority of MFIs rely on subsidies to achieve both their social and financial mission. 
In traditional framework, cost-benefit analyses are used to determine the allocation of 
subsidies. In the new world of microfinance, to understand the role of subsidies in the 
sustainability of microfinance institutions, Yaron‘s Subsidy Dependence Index 
(SDI)
10
 has been calculated which measures the degree to which an MFI relies on 
subsidies for its continued operations. The SDI is designed to measure the self-
sustainability level of the MFI with a single number. It is the ratio of subsidy received 
by a MFI to the revenue from loans to the target group. An SDI above zero means that 
the MFI still needs subsidy to operate—i.e., it has not achieved financial sustainability.  
Once MFIs lack the subsidies from government, in order to compensate the gap of 
subsidies, they must pass along all costs to customers. For example, they could set the 
high interest rate for loans. Consequently, any subsidy to the institution means that 
fewer costs have to be transferred to clients. And then, customers would increase 
gains through lower prices.  
Subsidy is very important for microfinance, but if MFIs want to attain sustainable 
development, they should realize financial self-sufficiently. In practice, subsidies in 
modern microfinance can be well-designed. Some microfinance institutions have 
found ways to promise serving very poor people and to achieve full financial self-
sufficiency. ASA
11
 of Bangladesh is a good example. It not only achieves financial 
missions but also its social missions. ―ASA Cost–effective and Sustainable 
Microfinance Model‖ should be adopted by the other MFIs around the world. 
                                        
10 
Primary resources on SDI used for this note are the following: 
Yaron, Jacob(1992a),Assessing development Finance Institutions: A Public Interest Analysis, World Bank. Discussion Paper 
174 .Washington, DC
 
11 ASA became self-sustainable within a short span of time and the organization declared itself a "donor free MFI" 
in 2001. 
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6 Conclusion 
By the extensive spread of microfinance, there is a growing concern about the 
sustainable development of microfinance institutions. Empirical researches provide 
convincing evidences for this issue. This thesis has given theoretical arguments based 
on information asymmetry that may constraint MFIs to target poor section. We 
construct a quality three-sided model consisting of the borrower, the MFI, and the 
informal money lender. The result of the model demonstrate how MFI reduces 
informal money lending and how a MFI can design the optimal contract for attracting 
more clients. To realize this, the MFI can improve its profit, and then it can achieve 
sustainable development. 
It is believed that the entry of MFIs would adversely impact informal sector lenders. It 
is puzzling that even with enormous growth of MFIs over the last few decades; we 
still see coexistence of these two forms of lending. The simple theoretical model 
explores the role of informational constraint on the optimal contract offered by MFIs. 
Among other findings, we see that MFIs objective to screen good projects from the 
bad projects may put additional constraint in removing informal sector lending or in 
increasing borrowers‘ payoff. So it follows that the MFIs can ensure their profits by 
keeping away risk. The MFI could provide financial service without subsidy if it 
keeps its profit. Finally, the MFI can develop a sustainable way. Sustainable 
microfinance expands the service scope, scale and depth, through the realization of 
financial sustainability and improves efficiency of alleviating poverty. 
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